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REVEALED ALTRUISM1
C. COX,DANIELFRIEDMAN,
ANDVJOLLCA
SADIRAJ
BYJAMES
This paper develops a nonparametrictheoryof preferencesover one's own and others' monetarypayoffs.We introduce"morealtruisticthan" (MAT), a partialordering
over such preferences,and interpretit with known parametricmodels. We also introduce and illustrate"moregenerous than"(MGT), a partialorderingover opportunity
sets. Several recent studies focus on two-playerextensive form games of complete informationin which the first mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity
set for the second mover (SM). Here reciprocitycan be formalizedas the assertionthat
an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferencesin the SM. A furtherassertion
is that the effect on preferencesis strongerfor acts of commissionby FM than for acts
of omission.We state and prove propositionson the observableconsequencesof these
assertions.Finally,empiricalsupportfor the propositionsis found in existingdata from
investmentand dictatorgames, the carrotand stickgame, and the Stackelbergduopoly
game and in new data from Stackelbergmini-games.
Neoclassicalpreferences,social preferences,convexity,reciprocity,exKEYWORDS:
periments.
1. INTRODUCTION

WHATARETHECONTENTS
OFPREFERENCES?
People surely care about their
own materialwell-being, for example, as proxied by income. In some contexts
people also may care about others' well-being. Abstract theory and common
sense have long recognized that possibility,but until recently it has been neglected in applied work. Evidence from the laboratoryand the field (as surveyed in Fehr and Gachter (2000), for example) has begun to persuadeeconomists to develop specific models of how and when a person's preferences
depend on others' materialpayoffs (Sobel (2005)).
Andreoni and Miller (2002) report "dictator"experiments in which a human subject decides on an allocation for himself and for some anonymous
other subjectwhile facing a linear budget constraint.Their analysisconfirms
consistencywith the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) for a
large majorityof subjects.They conclude that altruismcan be modeled using
neoclassicalpreference theory (Hicks (1939), Samuelson (1947)).
In this paper, we take three furthersteps down the same path. First,we analyze nonlinearopportunitysets. Such sets allow a playerto reveal more about
the tradeoff between her own and another'sincome, for example,whether her
'For helpful comments,we thankJames Andreoni, Geert Dhaene, Steven Gjerstad,Stephen
Leider, Joel Sobel, Stefan Traub,and Fransvan Winden as well as participantsin the International Meeting of the Economic Science Association (ESA) 2004, the North AmericanRegional
ESA Meeting 2004, and at Economics Departmentseminarsat UCSC, Harvard,and University
College London. The final revisionis much improveddue to the suggestionsof three anonymous
referees and an associate editor. Financialsupportwas providedby the National Science Foundation (Grant numbersIIS-0630805and IIS-0527770).
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indifference curves have positive or negative slope and whether they are linear or strictlyconvex. Second, we give another player an initial move that can
be more or less generous. This allows us to distinguishconditional altruismpositive and negative reciprocity-from unconditionalaltruism.It also allows
us to clarifythe observableconsequences of convex preferences and of reciprocal preferences.Third,we distinguishactive from passive initial moves; that
is, we distinguishamong acts of omission, acts of commission, and absence of
opportunityto act, and examine their impactson reciprocity.
Our goal is to develop an approachto reciprocityfirmlygroundedin neoclassical preference and demand theory.2By contrast, much of the existing literature on social preferences either ignores reciprocitymotives or grounds them
in psychologicalgame theory. Our focus is on how players'choices respond to
observable events and opportunities,rather than to their beliefs about other
players'intentions or types.
Section 2 begins by developing representationsof preferences over own and
others' income, and formalizesthe idea that one preference orderingis "more
altruisticthan" (MAT) another. It allows for the possibilityof negative regard
for the other's income; in this case MAT really means "less malevolent than."
Special cases include the main parametricmodels of other-regardingpreferences that have appearedin the literature.
Section 3 introducesopportunitiesand formalizesthe idea that one opportunity set can be more generous than (MGT) another. It explains that MGT
is a partial ordering over standard budget sets and is a complete ordering
over opportunitysets in severaltwo-playergames, includingthe well-knowninvestment, dictator,and Stackelbergduopoly games. Section A.5 demonstrates
MGT orderingsof opportunitysets for several other games in the literatureon
social preferences.
Section 4 formalizes reciprocity. Axiom R asserts that more generous
choices by a first mover induce more altruisticpreferences in a second mover.
An interpretation(advocated in Cox, Friedman,and Gjerstad (2007)) is that
preferences are emotional state-dependentand that the firstmover'sgenerosity induces a more benevolent (or less malevolent) emotional state in the second mover. Axiom S asserts that the reciprocityeffect is strongerfollowing an
act of commission(upsettingthe status quo) than following an act of omission
(upholdingthe status quo), and that the effect is weaker when the first mover
is unable to alter the status quo.
Section 5 presents three general theoretical propositions on the consequences of convexpreferences.Among other things,these propositionsextend
2Cox, Friedman,and Gjerstad(2007) took a similarperspective,but it imposed a tight parametricstructure(constantelasticityof substitution(CES)) on preferencesand reportedstructural
estimates from various existing data sets. Here we seek general results attributableto general
properties such as convexityand reciprocity,and we test the results directlyon new as well as
existingdata.
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standardresults on revealed preference theory and show how easy it is in empiricalwork to conflate the separateeffects of convexityand reciprocity.
Sections 6-9 bring revealed altruismtheory to four data sets. Proposition4
derivestestable predictionsfor investmentand dictatorgames. Together,these
two games provide diagnostic data for both Axioms R and S. Propositions 5
and 6 derive testable predictions for carrot and stick games and for Stackelberg duopoly games. The duopoly games are especially useful because the
Follower'sopportunitysets are MGT-orderedand have a parabolicshape that
enables the Follower to reveal a wide range of positive and negative trade-offs
between his own income and the Leader's income. Proposition7 obtains predictionsfor a new variantgame, called the Stackelbergmini-game,in which the
Leader has only two alternativeoutput choices, one of which is clearly more
generous than the other. This game providesdiagnosticdata for discriminating
between the effects of convexityand reciprocity.
Within the limitations of the data, the test results are consistent with predictions. Following a concluding discussion, Appendix A collects all formal
proofs and other mathematicaldetails. Instructionsto subjects in the Stackelberg mini-gameappearin Appendix B.
2. PREFERENCES

Let Y = (Y1, Y2, ..., YN) E 91N represent the payoff vector in a game that
pays each of N > 2 players a nonnegativeincome. Admissible preferences for
each player i are smooth and convex orderingson the positive orthantrTN that
are strictlyincreasingin own income Yi.The set of all admissiblepreferencesis
denoted T3.Any particularpreference P E q3can be representedby a smooth
utilityfunction u:•N N_ NI with positive ith partialderivativedu/dYi = Iuy > 0.
The other firstpartialderivativesare zero for standardselfish preferences,but
we allow for the possibilitythat they are positive in some regions (where the
agent is "benevolent")and negative in others (where she is "malevolent").
We shall focus on two-playerextensiveform games of complete information,
and to streamlinenotation we shall denote own ("my")income by Yi = m and
= y. Thus preferences are defined
the other player's ("your")income by
on the positive quadrantN2 - {(m, y) Y-i
m, y > 0}. The marginalrate of sub=
stitution MRS(m, y) um/lu is not well defined at points where the agent is
selfish;it divergesto +oo and back from -oo when we pass from slight benevolence to slight malevolence. Therefore, it is convenient to work with willingness to pay, WTP = 1/MRS, the amount of own income the agent is willing to
give up in order to increase the other agent's income by a unit; it moves from
slightly positive through zero to slightly negative when the agent goes from
slight benevolence to slight malevolence. Note that WTP = uly/um is intrinsic,
independent of the particularutility function u chosen to represent the given
preferences.
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What sort of factors might affect w = WTP? Of course, for admissiblepreferences the sign of w is the same as the sign of the partialderivativeu,. Convexitytells us more: w increasesas one moves southwardalong an indifference
curve. That is, my benevolence increases (or malevolence decreases) as your
income decreases along an indifferencecurve. This principleis quite intuitive,
and sometimes it is useful to strengthen it as follows. We say that admissible
Occasionpreferenceshave the increasingbenevolence(IB) propertyif wm O0.
Section A.1 shows how convexity,
ally we refer to the related propertyw < O0.
increasingbenevolence, and homotheticityare related to each other and to the
slope and curvatureof indifferencecurves.
We are now prepared to formalize the idea that one preference ordering
on 9•2 is more altruistic than another. Two different preference orderings
G
over income allocation vectors might represent the preferences of
A, B c3
two differentplayersor might represent the preferences of the same player in
two different situations.
DEFINITION
1: For a given domain D c 921we say that A MAT B on D if
>
WTPA(m,y) WTPB(m,y) for all (m, y) E D.
The idea is straightforward.Like the single crossingpropertyin a different
context, MAT induces a partial orderingon preferences over own and others'
income. In the benevolence case, A MAT B means that A has shallower indifference curves than B in (m, y) space, so A indicates a willingness to pay
more m for a unit increase in y than does B. In the malevolence case, WTP is
less negative for A, so it indicatesa lesser willingnessto pay for a unit decrease
in y.
Section A.2 verifiesthat MAT is a partialorderingon q3.When no particular
domain D is indicated, the MAT orderingis understood to refer to the entire
positive orthantD = 12.
Four examples illustratehow MAT is incorporatedinto existing parametric
models.
2.1--LinearInequality-AversePreferences (for N = 2; Fehr and
EXAMPLE
Schmidt (1999)): Let preferences J = A, B be represented by uj(m, y) =
(1 + Oj)m - Ojy, where
{/I j,
Oj-

if

<

m y,
y,

-s,

< 1. Straightforwardly,A MAT B if and only if
with p3 < a8 and 0 < pifnm_
0O < 0B.
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2.2-Nonlinear Inequality-AversePreferences(for N = 2; Bolton
EXAMPLE
and Ockenfels (2000)): Let preferences J = A, B be represented by
uj(m, y) = vj(m, o-), where

m/(m + y), ifm+y > 0,

if m+ y = 0.

r- 1/2,

It can be easily verifiedthat A MAT B if and only if VA1/VA2<

V1/v82.

EXAMPLE
2.3-Quasi-Maximin Preferences(for N = 2; Charnessand Rabin
(2002)): Let preferences J = A, B be representedby

u

my

m+ yj(1 - 8j)y,
(1 - 8,y)m +

if m < y,

y•y,

if m > y,

and y E [0, 1], 8 E (0, 1). It is straightforward(although a bit tedious) to
verifythat A MAT B if and only if

> max)
YAY_)L

1- 8 1

EXAMPLE
2.4-Egocentric Altruism(CES) Preferences(for N = 2; Cox and
Sadiraj(2007)): Let preferences J= A, B be representedby

Y
u
j(ma
u,(m, y)=
a
Ja),
myOj,

if a

(-oo, 1)\{0),
if a = 0.

If 0 < OB

O, then A MAT B. Verification is straightforward:WTPJ =
_< and =
O,(m/y)1-a,
5 A, B imply WTP /WTPe = 8A/80 > 1. "Egocentric-

- E,x + e) for any E (0, x), which
ity" means that uj(x + s, x - e) > U
r(X
<
1.
WTP(m,
m)
implies

Much of the theoretical literatureon social preferences relies on special assumptionsthat may appearto be departuresfrom neoclassicalpreference theory (Hicks (1939), Samuelson (1947)). The preceding examples help clarify
the issues. All four are examples of convex preferences and (except for the
nonlinear inequalityaversionmodel) they are also homothetic. The inequality
aversionmodels incorporatea very specific inconsistencywith the neoclassical

assumptionof positivemonotonicity:
my marginalutilityfor yourincomereversessignon the 45 degreeline.A preferencefor efficiency(i.e., for a larger
income sum) is consistent with a limiting case of the quasi-maximinmodel or
with admissible preferences with WTP = 1. We shall now see that for more

generalpreferences,the efficiencyof choicesdependson the shapeof the opportunityset.
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3. OPPORTUNITIES
Define an opportunityset F (or synonymously,a feasible set or budget set)
as a convex compact subset of 92. It is convenient and harmless (given preferences monotone in own income m) to assume free disposal for own income,
that is, if (m, y) E F, then (am, y) e F for all a E [0, 1]. Thus an opportunity
set F is the convex hull of two lines: (a) its projection YF= {y > O: 3m > 0 s.t.
(m, y) e F} on the y axis and (b) its eastern boundarydEF = {(m, y) E F:Vx >
m, (x, y) 4 F).
Since F is convex, each boundarypoint has a supportinghyperplane (i.e.,
tangent line) defined by an inward-pointingnormalvector, and F is contained
in its closed positive half-space;see, for example, Rockafellar (1970, p. 100).
At some boundarypoints (informallycalled corners or kinks) the supporting
hyperplane is not unique; examples will be noted later. At the other (regular) boundary points there is a smooth function f whose zero isoquant defines the boundarylocally. We often need to work near vertical tangents, so
rather than the usual marginal rate of transformation(MRT), we use the
need to pay, NTP(m, y) = 1/MRT(m, y) = f,/fm, evaluated at a regularpoint
(m, y) e 8EF.Again NTP is intrinsic,independent of the choice f used to represent the boundarysegment.
We seek an objective definition of one opportunityset G being more generous to me than another opportunity set F. There is an obvious necessary
condition: that G allows me to achieve higher income than does F. Since my
preferences are monotone in own income, I clearlybenefit when you allow me
to increase it. For some purposes, it is helpful to impose a second condition:
that you do not increaseyour own potential income far more than mine. If you
do, I might regardyour move as self-servingand not especiallygenerous.
These intuitionsare capturedin conditions (a) and (b) in Definition 2 below,
using the following notation. Let y; = sup YF denote your maximumfeasible
income and let m* = sup{m:3y > 0 s.t. (m, y) e Fl denote my maximumfeasible income in an opportunityset F.
2: Opportunityset G C 912 is more generous than opportunity
DEFINITION
set F c 92 if (a) m - m* > 0 and (b) m* - m* > y? - y;. In this case we write
G MGT F.
MGT is a partial ordering over opportunitysets, as noted in Section A.3.
Condition (a) seems compellingbecause it springsdirectlyfrom the most basic
intuitions about generosity, but one can imagine plausible variantson condition (b). To understandits role, consider an alternativedefinitionof MGT,call
it MGT Light, that includes only condition (a). It turns out that MGT Light
has the same implicationsas MGT for 10 of the 12 prominentexamples of opportunitysets from the social preferencesliteraturediscussedin this section, in
Section 9, and in Section A.5. We begin with a very prominentexample where
condition (b) does matter.
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I/PG

Y

IF/PF

0

m
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G

FIGURE1.-Standard budget set.

EXAMPLE
3.1--Standard Budget Set: Let F = {(m, y) e N:"m + py < Il
for given p, I > 0. Then the eastern boundarydEF is the budget line {(m, y) E
N:21m+ py = I}, as shown by the solid line in Figure 1. The NTP is p along
dEF. Clearly m* = I and yF = I/p. To illustrate the MGT ordering, let F be
determinedby IF and pF and let G be determined by IG and pG. Part (a) of
is simplyIG IF, but part (b) requiresIG - IF > IG/PG - IF/IPF
the definition
For example, if IG = 1*.1F while pG = PF/100 so y= = 110y, as shown by the
dashed line in Figure 1, then you have not clearly revealed generosity toward
me by choosing G over F, since you are servingyour own materialinterestsfar
more than mine. Yourchoice would more clearlyrevealgenerosityif G (and F)
were also consistentwith part (b).
3.2-Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)):
EXAMPLE
In this two-playersequential move game, the firstmover (FM) and the second
mover (SM) each have an initialendowmentof I > 1. The FM sends an amount
s E [0, I] to SM, who receives ks. Then the SM returns an amount r E [0, ks]
to the FM, resultingin payoffs m = I + ks - r for the SM and y = I - s + r for
the FM. The FM's choice of s selects the SM's opportunityset F, with Eastern
boundary{(m, y) e 92 :m + y = 21 + (k - 1)s, m e [I, I + ks]} with NTP = 1.
Figure 2 shows Fs for s = 3 and 9 when I = 10 and k = 3. In the figure, one
= 37 > 19 =
sees that (a)
and (b) y;9 -Y;3 = 28 - 16 = 12 < 18=
m)9
mF3
37 - 19 =
so
MGT
F3. More generally, it is straightforwardto
- m,
F9
m9
check that s > s' e [0, I] implies for k > 2 that F, MGT Fs,, that is, sending a
larger amount is indeed more generous.
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FIGURE2.-Investment game: second mover'sopportunityset.

EXAMPLE3.3-Carrot and/or Stick Games (Andreoni, Harbaugh, and
Vesterlund (2003)): In each of the games, the FM has an initial endowment
of 240 and the SM has an initial endowment of 0. The FM sends an amount
s e [40, 240] to the SM, who receives s. The SM then returns an amount r
which is multipliedby 5 for the FM, resultingin payoffs m = s - Irlfor the SM
and y = 240 - s + 5r for the FM.
The games differ only on the sign restrictions placed on r. In the stick
game, the SM can punish the FM at a personal cost by "returning"nonpositive amounts r that do not make either person's payoff negative. The FM's
choice s induces an MGT ordering on the SM opportunitysets Fs. Part (a)
of the definition is satisfied because m* = s and part (b) is satisfied because
ys = 240 - s. For F = Fs and G = F,, with s < s', we have y - y = -(s'- s) <
0

<s'-

s= m

-- m.

In the carrotgame, the SM's choice must be nonnegative,r E [0, s]. Here the
FM's choice s does not induce an MGT orderingon the SM opportunitysets
F,. Of course, m*, = s still ensures that part (a) of MGT is satisfied and thus
the opportunitysets are MGT Light ordered. However, = 240 - s + 5s =
= 4(s'- s) >
240 + 4s. For F = Fs and G = F,, with s < s', we have yyj;definition.
y,*
of
the
MGT
s' s= m*
contradictingpart (b)
m-, game drops the sign restrictionson the SM's choice: here
The carrot-stick
the positive or negative amountsreturnedr cannot make either person'spayoff
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setsarenot MGT-ordered
negative.As in the carrotgame,the SMopportunity
becausepart(b) is not satisfied(thoughtheyareorderedbyMGTLight).
EXAMPLE
3.4-Stackelberg Duopoly Game (e.g., Varian (1992, pp. 295-

298)): Considera duopolywithzero fixedcost, constantand equalmarginal
cost, andnontriviallineardemand.Withoutfurtherloss of generalityone can
normalizeso that the profitmargin(priceminusmarginalcost) is M = T qL- qF,whereqLE [0, T] is the Leader'soutputchoiceandqF E [0, T - qL]is
the Follower'soutput to be chosen. Thus payoffs are m = MqF and y = MqL.

The Follower'sopportunityset F(qL)has as its easternboundarya parabolic
arc opening toward the y axis, as shown in Figure 3 for T = 24 and qL = 6, 8,

and 11. Unlikethe earlierexamples,the NTPvariessmoothlyfromnegative
to positivevaluesas one movesnorthwardalongthe boundary.Theseopportunitysets areMGTorderedbythe Leader'soutputchoice;see SectionA.4 of
the Appendixfor a verificationandfor explicitformulasforNTP.
These four examplesare far from exhaustive.SectionA.5 of the Appendix demonstratesnaturalMGTorderingsof opportunitysets in manygames
prominentin the socialpreferencesliterature,includingthe ultimatumgame
andSchwarze(1982)),the ultimatummini-game(Gale,
(Giith,Schmittberger,
and
Samuelson
Binmore,
(2003)),
(1995);see alsoFalk,Fehr,andFischbacher
140
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FIGURE3.-Stackelberg duopolygame: Follower'sopportunityset.
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the sequential public goods game with two players (Varian (1994)), the gift
exchange labor market (Fehr, Kirchsteiger,and Riedl (1993)), the moonlighting game (Abbink, Irlenbusch,and Renner (2000)), the power to take game
(Bosman and van Winden (2002)), and the ring test (Liebrand(1984); see also
Sonnemans,van Dijk, and van Winden (2006)).
4. RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity is key to our analysis. We examine it from the perspective of
neoclassicalpreference theory, stressingobservables.Thus positive reciprocity
reveals itself via preferences for altruisticactions that benefit someone else,
at one's own materialcost, becausethat person'sbehaviorwas generous. Similarly, negative reciprocityreveals itself via preferences for actions that harm
someone else, at one's own material cost, because that person's behavior was
harmfulto oneself. Our reciprocityaxiomstates that more generous choices by
one player induce more altruisticpreferences in a second player;by the same
token, less generous choices by one induce less altruisticpreferences in the
other.
To formalize, consider a two-person extensive form game of complete information in which the first mover chooses an opportunityset C E C and the
second mover chooses the payoffvector (m, y) e C. Initially,the second mover
knows the collection C of possible opportunitysets. Priorto her choice of payoffs, she learns the actual opportunityset C e C, and acquirespreferences Ac.
Reciprocityis capturedin the following axiom.
AXIOMR: Let thefirst moverchoose the actual opportunityset for the second
moverfrom the collectionC. If F, G EC and G MGT F, then AG MATAF.
There is a traditionaldistinctionbetween sins of commission(active imposition of harm) and sins of omission (failure to prevent harm). By analogy, one
can drawa distinctionbetween the "virtues"of commissionand omission. Another person's benevolent or malevolent intentions are more clearly revealed
by an action that overturnsthe status quo than by inaction. Of course, sometimes there is no choice possible; the status quo cannot be altered. Intuitively,
the second mover will respond more strongly to generous (or ungenerous)
choices that overturn the status quo than to those that uphold it or that involve no real choice by the firstmover.3Comparedto no choice, upholdingthe
status quo should provoke the strongerresponse, at least when the status quo
is the best or worst possible opportunity.
To formalize the intuition, suppose that the collection of opportunitysets C
contains at least two elements, and one of them, C*, is the status quo. Let Ac*
3This intuition goes back at least to Adam Smith's 1759 Theoryof Moral Sentiments(Smith
(1976, p. 181)).
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andAcc,respectively,
when
denotethesecondmover'sacquired
preferences
thefirstmover'schosenopportunity
set C is thestatusquoandwhenit differs
from the status quo. On the other hand, when C is a singleton, then the first

moverhasno choiceandwe writeC= {C0}withcorresponding
secondmover

preferences
Aco.
AXIOMS: Let thefirst moverchoose the actual opportunitysetfor the second
moverfrom the collection C. If the status quo is eitherF or G and G MGT F,
then:
1. AGc MATAG*, AGo and AF*, AFOMATAFC,
2. AG*MAT AGOif G MGT C for all C e C, and AFo MATAF*if C MGT F
for all C E C.
Part 1 of Axiom S says that the effect of Axiom R is strongerwhen a generous (or ungenerous) act upsets the status quo than when the same act merely
upholds the status quo (or is forced). Part2 comparesthe impact of upholding
the status quo to forced acts. It says that the effect of Axiom R is strongerfor
upholdingthe status quo, at least when that is the most (or least) generous of
the options availableto the firstmover.
We will say that either axiomholds strictlywhen the inequalitiesin the MAT
and the MGT part (a) definitionsare both strict.
It should be emphasized that the recent preference models noted in Examples 2.1-2.4 have no room for Axioms R and S. In those models preferences
are assumed fixed, unaffected by more or less generous opportunitysets chosen by the first mover. Actual choices by a first mover are not central even in
the "reciprocity"models of Charness and Rabin (2002, Appendix), Falk and
Fischbacher(2006), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger(2004). Those models
focus on higher-orderbeliefs regardingother players'intentions (or, in Levine
(1998), regardingother players' types). Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007)
implicitlyconsidered Axiom R, but only within the particularparametricfamily of CES utilityfunctions noted in Example 2.4.
5. CHOICE

As in neoclassical theory, our maintained assumption is that the player always chooses a most preferred point in his opportunity set F. By convexity
such points must form a connected subset of F. If either preferences A or opportunities F are strictlyconvex, then that subset is a singleton, that is, there
is a unique choice
e F. In this case all points in F \ {(mA, yA)} are
(m., y.)
revealed to be on lower A-indifference curves than (mA,

y•).
Not all elements of F are candidatesfor choice in our setup.
The first result
is that, due to strict monotonicityin own payoff m, only points on the eastern
boundarywill be chosen, since they have largerown payoff.

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

42

J. C. COX,D. FRIEDMAN,AND V.SADIRAJ

1: Let (mA, YA)be an A-chosenpoint in F. Then (mA, YA) e
PROPOSITION
dEF. The choice is unique if eitherthepreferencesA or the opportunityset F is
strictlyconvex.
All proofs are collected in Appendix A.
The next result shows that as admissible preferences go from maximally
malevolentthroughneutralto maximallybenevolent under the MAT ordering,
the player'schoices trace out the entire eastern boundaryof the opportunity
set. The proposition refers to the northernpoint NF = (m, yF) E dEF and the
southern point SF, the point in the eastern boundarywith smallest y component.
2: Supposethat eitherpreferencesA and B or the opportunity
PROPOSITION
set F are strictlyconvex.Let (mA, yA) and (m,, y1) be the points in F chosen
whenpreferencesare, respectively,A and 13.Then:
1. B MAT A impliesyB > YA.
2. If (m, y) E dEF and y, > Y > yA, then thereare admissiblepreferencesP
with 13MAT7PMAT A such that (m, y) is the P-chosen point in F.
3. Thereare admissiblepreferencesfor which the chosen point is arbitrarily
close to SF, and other admissiblepreferencesfor which the chosen point is arbitrarilyclose to NF.
Propositions1 and 2 deal with a fixed opportunityset. Often we need predictions of how an agent with given preferenceswill choose in a new opportunity
set. Neoclassicalpreferencetheoryoffers a predictionthat follows from GARP
(or from convexityand positive monotonicity) in the case of standardbudget
sets. We will sometimesget weakerpredictionsand sometimes strongerpredictions because we deal with more general opportunitysets and with preferences
that are convex but not necessarilymonotone in other's income y. The following example illustratesthis.
5.1: Figure 4 shows standard budget sets F with I = 1, p = 1
EXAMPLE
(solid line) and G with I = 2, p = 4 (dashed line). Suppose that a player with
preferences P picks (mF, YF) from F. What can we predict about his choice
(mG, YG)from G? If it happens that (mF,yF) is not in G, then neoclassical
preference theorytells us nothing about (mG, YG).Given the increasingbenevolence propertyIB, we can make a prediction:(mG, YG)lies on the subsegment
southeast of the point (m, y,) on the G budget line, that is, yG < yF. This is a
consequence of part 2(a) of the next proposition.
The result in Example 5.1 can often be strengthenedin nonlinear opportunity sets. The point chosen in one opportunityset can be compared to points
east of it in anotheropportunityset using IB, as in part2(b) of the next proposition. As shown in part 3 of the next proposition,using IB together with wy< 0,
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FIGURE4.-Illustration of Example5.1.

we can obtain even tighter bounds on choice by constructinga point Z which
solves NTPdF(X) =NTPIG(Z). (The Appendix shows how to extend the definition so that Z is well defined even with cornersand kinks at which NTP is not
single valued.) We say that Z = (mz, yz) is southeast of X = (mx, Yx) if and
only if yz < yx and mz > mx, and Z is northwestof X if both inequalitiesare
reversed.
Figure 5 illustratesthe constructionof Z and the main implicationsof the
next proposition. Part 1 of the proposition is simplystandardrevealed preference. Part 2 uses IB to compare WTP at points directly east or west of each
other, while part 3 compares points with the same WTP in different opportunity sets.
PROPOSITION
3: Let a player with strictlyconvexpreferencesA choose X =
opportunityset F and choose W = (mG, YG)from opportunity
set G. Then:
1. IfX E G, then WeG \ F or W = X.
2. Let Y = (ii, yF) E EG have maximali and supposepreferencesA satisfy
IB. Then:
(a) YG< YFif NTPaF(X) < NTPdG(Y)and ii mF.
(b) yG > YF if NTPaF(X) > NTPdG(Y)and h > mF.
(mF, YF) from
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y
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F
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FIGURE5.-Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition3 predict that, with unchangedIB preferences, the
choice W on the easternboundaryof G will lie between points Y and Z. Part 1 of the proposition
predictsthat W is north of point P.

3. Let Z = (mz, Yz) E dEG solve NTPaF(X) = NTPaG(Z),and supposepreferencesA satisfyIB and w < O0.Then:
(a) YG> Yzif Z is southeastof X.
(b) YG< Yzif Z is northwestof X.
Propositions 1-3 do not invoke Axioms R and S. We now shall see that Axiom R effects can either reinforce or offset the standardrevealed preference
predictions,depending on the first mover'sgenerosity. The next example also
highlightsunique predictionsarisingfrom Axiom S.
5.2: Suppose that there is a first mover (FM) who picks one of
EXAMPLE
the two standardbudget sets for the second mover (SM) in Example5.1. Since
G MGT F, Axiom R implies that the SM's choice W E G lies northwestof the
point (mG, YG)predictedby convexityof preferencesand the IB property;since
(mG, YG) is predicted to be southeast of (m, yF), our model has no testable
implicationin this instance. Recall that neoclassicalpreference theory also has
no testable implicationwhen (mF,YF)does not belong to G. If the FM instead
chooses F, then Axiom R implies that the choice X lies southeast of (mF, YF),
whereas neoclassical preference theory predicts that X = (mF, YF). Axiom S
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implies that the choice X* when the status quo is F lies southeast of the choice

Xo when the FM has no choice, and that the choice Xc when the status quo

is G lies even further southeast. In contrast, neoclassical preference theory
assumes preferences are fixed and therefore predictsXc = X* = Xo.
6. DIAGNOSTICTESTS OF AXIOMS R AND S WITH INVESTMENT
AND DICTATORGAME DATA

Building on Example 5.2, one could design an experimentto test the theory
using two-playersequential move games involving standardbudget sets that
are ordered by MGT.We will, instead, use existingdata from experimentswith
the investment and dictator games. (In the dictator game, the experimenter
gives the SM her opportunityset; the FM has no say in the matter.) These
games are better suited to testing behavioralimplicationsof Axioms R and S,
as summarizedin the following proposition.
4: Let the FM in the investmentgame choose F, as the SM's
PROPOSITION
and
let r(s) be the SM's response.Also let the SM be given the
set
opportunity
same opportunityset Fs in a dictatorgame and let ro(s) be his responsethere.
1. If the SM'spreferences.A arefixed and satisfyIB, then ro(s) increasesin s.
2. If the SM's preferencessatisfyAxiom R and IB, then r(s) increasesmore
rapidlyin s than does ro(s).
3. If the SM'spreferencesalso satisfyAxiom S, then r(s) > ro(s) for all feasible s.
Proposition4 leads to a diagnostictest of Axioms R and S. Our model would
be falsifiedby observationsif, contraryto parts 1 and 2, the SMs returnmore in
either game when they get s than when they get s' > s; or if, contraryto part 3,
the SMs return more in a dictator game than in an investmentgame with the
same opportunitysets F,.
Using a double-blindprotocol, Cox (2004) gathered data from a one-shot investment game (TreatmentA) with 32 pairsof FMs and SMs. Cox also reported
paralleldata from a dictatorgame (TreatmentC) with another 32 subjectpairs
in which the dictators (SMs) were given exactly the same opportunitysets by
the experimenteras were given to the SMs by the FMs in the investmentgame.
In both treatments,the choices s and r were restrictedto integervalues but the
conclusionsof Proposition4 still hold.
To test the predictions,constructthe dummyvariableD = 1 for TreatmentC.
Regress the SM choice r on the amount sent s and its interaction with D,
using a censored regression to account for the limited range of SM choices
(r E [0, 3s]).4 The estimated coefficient for s is 0.58 (+ standarderror of 0.22)
4Theconstantis set equal to zero because this is impliedby the experimentaldesign restriction
that SMs cannot returnmore than they receive from FMs.
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with one-sided p value of 0.006, consistentwith reciprocityand parts 1 and 2 of
Proposition4. The estimated coefficient for D x s is -0.69 (?0.32, p = 0.018),
consistent with Axiom S and part 3 of Proposition4. Since the coefficient sum
is statisticallyindistinguishablefrom 0, the convexity prediction in part 1 of
Proposition4 is neither supportednor contradicted.
The above estimationuses observationsfor all amountssent s. We here confirmthe Axiom S tests resultby directhypothesistests using a subset of the data
with sufficientobservationsfor paired tests: s = 5 (with 7 observationsin each
treatment) and s = 10 (with 13 observationsin each treatment). The MannWhitney and t test both reject the null hypothesis of no difference between
the amountsreturnedin favor of the strictAxiom S alternativehypothesisthat
returns are larger in TreatmentA. The one-sided p values for the t test (respectivelythe Mann-Whitneytest) are 0.027 (0.058) for the s = 5 data and are
0.04 (0.10) for the s = 10 data.5
7. TESTS WITH CARROT AND STICKGAME DATA

Carrot and stick games support within-game direct tests of our model and
suggest one across-gamestest. The following proposition drawsout the implications of these games.
PROPOSITION
5: Let the FM in the stick, carrot,or carrot-stickgame choose
as
the
SM's
opportunityset and let r(s) be the SM's response.
FI
1. If the SM'spreferencesA arefixed and satisfyIB, then r(s) increasesin s.
2. If the SM'spreferencessatisfyAxiom R and IB, then in the stickgame r(s)
increasesmorerapidlyin s thanfor fixedpreferences.
The model would be falsified by data for any of these games in which SMs
chose largerreturnsr(s) for smalleramountss sent by the FM. The model suggests that for a given s, smaller(or more negative) returnsr shouldbe observed
in the stickgame than in the carrot-stickgame. The reasons are two-fold.First,
comparing the opportunityset Fssfor given s in stick to that in carrot-stick
one sees that Fs MGT Fscs. The MGT ordering across games suggests
(FsCS),
that
reciprocitywill boost r in the stick game above its value in the carrot-stick
game. Second, comparingparts 1 and 2 of the last proposition, one sees that
reciprocityboosts r in the stick game but not in the other two.
Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003) reported data from carrot,
stick, and carrot-stick games, each with 30 pairs of FMs and SMs randomly
matched over 10 periods. They focused on choices in the last 5 periods and so
shall we.6 The SM's opportunityset has a kink at r = 0 in all three games67%, 57%, and 41% of the SM choices are at the kink,respectively,in the stick
5Figure3 in Cox (2004), showingdata from TreatmentsA and C, contains a couple of errors.
A file with (correct) data from the two treatmentsis availableupon request to the author.
6Spotchecks indicateno substantialchanges in resultswhen all 10 periods are included.
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FIGURE6.-Fractions of zero returnsacrossgames when the firstmoverssend 40 or 120. Only
data from the last five rounds are included.

game, carrotgame, and carrot-stickgame-but the kink has different implications acrossgames because FM choices differ acrossgames. Figure 6 showsthe
percentages of constrained (r = 0) responses in the three games for two focal
FM choices: the minimum allowable amount sent (s = 40) and the equal-split
amount sent (s = 120).

We want to compare SM choices r across games holding the FM choice s
constant and also want to estimate the impact of s on r in each game. The
kinks and resultingreturnsof zero lead us to separate the data into two parts,
correspondingto the data presentation in Figures 5 and 6 in Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003): a stick regime with choices r < 0 and a carrot
regime with choices r > 0. The carrot-stick data are included in both regimes
and are indicated by the dummyvariableDCS. We use two-sided tobit estimators since the lower bound in the stick regime also binds occasionally,as does
the upper bound in the carrot regime. Random individualsubject effects help
control for heterogeneous preferences across subjects.
Table I reports the results. Consistent with the predictions from Proposition 5, the amount sent s (send) has a significantlypositive impact in all games
and regimes. The estimate 0.36 in the stick regime indicates that, on average,a
FM who sends 100 more in stickwill increase r and thus increase his gross pay-
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TABLEI
FORDEPENDENT
TOBITPANEL
REGRESSIONS
WITHRANDOM
EFFECTS
VARIABLE
r
StickRegimea

Constant

CarrotRegimea

-31.91

(0.00)
DCS

-23.34

(0.03)
Send
DCS x send
Left, uncensored,rightb

-58.10

(0.00)
-48.25

(0.01)

0.36

0.41

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.26
(0.03)
(15, 67, 218)

-0.09
(0.23)
(179, 112, 9)

aDataarefromthelast5 periodsof carrotand/orstickgames(Andreoni,Harbaugh,andVesterlund
(2003)).One-sidedp valuesareshownin parentheses.
bThelastrowshowsthe numberof left censoredobservations,
uncensoredobservations,andright
censoredobservations.

off by 5 x 36 = 180, for a net gain of 80. In carrot-stick,the estimated marginal
impact in this regime is 0.36 + 0.26 = 0.62, significantlylarger at the 3% level,
but the intercept is significantlymore negative, at -31.9 - 23.3 = -55.2. The
estimated return function is rS(s) = -31.9 + 0.36s for stick, which lies everywhere above its carrot-stick counterpartrcss(s) = -55.2 + 0.62s in the r < 0
regime. Thus the estimates are consistent with the model's informal acrossgames implication.
The table reports similar results for the carrot regime. Again as predicted,
the amount sent s by the FM has a significantlypositive marginalimpact on
the amount returnedby the SM. The 0.41 coefficient in the carrotgame is not
distinguishablefrom that in the carrot-stickgame in the same regime or from
its stick counterpart.The model offers no hint about the relative positions of
the returnfunctions in this regime, but the data show that the carrotfunction
rc(s) is significantlyhigher than the carrot-stick function rCSC(s)in the r > 0
regime.
8. TESTS WITH STACKELBERGDUOPOLYDATA

A limitationof the precedingapplicationsis that data come from games with
opportunitysets with linear eastern boundaries,so SMs face a constant NTP.
The standardStackelberggame in Example3.4 escapes this straightjacket.Recall that smaller output choices by the StackelbergLeader create MGT opportunitysets for the Follower. Axiom R says that this will induce MAT preferences in the Follower. Due to the higher WTP,it seems that the Follower
should choose points on the easternboundarywith higherNTP,hence largery,
by reducingoutput.
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It is not quite that simple, however. We must also take into account preference convexityand also the changingcurvatureof the opportunityset. The
next propositionsorts out these effects and expressesthem in terms of the Follower's deviation from selfish best reply (the prediction of standardduopoly
theory).
6: In the Stackelberg
PROPOSITION
game of Example3.4 let QD(qL) = qF- q
be the deviationof the Follower'soutputchoice qFfrom the selfishbestreply =
qF
12 - (qLwhenthe Leaderchooses outputqL. One has
dw
dQD =--w-1
qw,
2
dqL
dqL
wherew = WTP(MqF,MqL) is willingnessto pay at the chosenpoint. Furthermore:
1. If the Follower'spreferencesA arefixed and linear,then w is constantwith
respectto qL and dQD/dqLispositiveif and onlyifpreferencesat the chosenpoint
are malevolent.
2. If the Follower'spreferencesA arefixed, and satisfyIB and w < 1, then w is
decreasingin qL and dQD/dqLcontainsan additionalpositiveterm.
3. If the Follower'spreferencessatisfyAxiom R strictly,then w is decreasingin
qLand dQr /dqL containsan additionalpositiveterm.
4. If Follower'spreferencessatisfyAxiom S strictly,then w is decreasingin
qL
and dQl/dqL has an additionalpositive(negative)termif thestatusquo is smaller
(larger)than qL.
Proposition6 shows that an increase in qLhas three differenteffects:
* A reciprocityeffect-items 3 and 4 in the proposition. If Axiom R holds
strictly,then the less generousopportunityset decreasesthe Follower'sWTP,
increasingqF and qD = QD (qL). Axiom S moderatesor intensifiesthis effect,
depending on the status quo.
* A preference convexity (or substitution) effect-item 2 in the proposition.
The choice point is pushed west, where WTP is less, again increasingqD.
* An opportunity set shape effect (in some ways analogous to an income
effect)-item 1 in the proposition.The curvatureof the paraboladecreases.
Holding w = WTP constant, qD increases when the Follower is malevolent (w < 0, hence qD > 0) and decreases when the Follower is benevolent
(w > 0, hence qD < 0).
A parametricexample may clarifythe logic. For given qL e [0, 24], the Fol-

lower's choice set is the parabola {(m, y): m = MqF, y = MqL, M= 24 - qL = (24 - qL - 2qF)/
qF, qF e [0, 24 - qL]}, with NTP = -(dm/dqF)/(dy/dqF)

qL. Suppose that the Follower has fixed Cobb-Douglas preferences repre-

sented by u(m, y) = mye, so WTP is Om/y = OqF/qL. Solving NTP = WTP,

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.172 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 16:33:30 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

50

J. C. COX, D. FRIEDMAN, AND V. SADIRAJ

one obtains qF = Q(qLIO)= (24 - qL)/(2 + 0). Noting that the selfish best
= Q(qL10), one obtains a closed form expression for the deviareply is
= tion: qD q(24 - qL). For fixed 0 positive (benevolent preferences) or
smallerthan -2 (pathologicallymalevolent preferences), the deviation is negative but increasingin the Leader's output; the opposite is true when 0 is negative but largerthan -2 (moderatelymalevolent). This is the combined impact
of the convexity (or substitution)and shape (or income) effects noted above.
Of course, reciprocityeffects will decrease 0 and hence increase qD.
We test predictionsobtained from Proposition6 on the Stackelbergduopoly
data of Huck, Miiller, and Normann (2001, henceforth HMN). The parameters are exactly as in Example 3.4 with integer output choices. The data
consist of 220 output pairs (qL, qF) by 22 FMs (or Leaders) choosing qL E
{3, 4, 5, ..., 15} randomlyrematchedfor 10 periods each with 22 SMs (or Followers)who choose qF E {3, 4, 5, ..., 15}. The WTP can be inferredat a chosen
point (qL,qF) by the NTP at that point, (24 - 2qF - qL)/qL.
Table II reports the test results. All observationsreveal w < 1, as assumed
in Proposition 6. To check for asymmetricresponses to large and small FM
choices (relativeto the Cournotchoice qL= 8), we define the dummyvariable
DP = 1 if qL< 8. All columnsin the table reportpanel regressionswith individual subjectfixed effects. The firstcolumn,with dependentvariableWTP x 100,
firmlyrejectsthe hypothesisof benevolent linear and fixedpreferences:the coefficient for qL is significantlynegative, not positive. In view of part 1 of the
proposition,the second column,with dependent variable QD, confirmsthis result. We infer that QD is an increasingfunction of FM output qL, consistent
with convexityand reciprocity,in view of parts 2 and 3 of the proposition. The
last column reportsthat there is a strongerresponse to "greedy"FM choices in
excess of the Cournotoutput 8 than to "generous"FM choices below or equal
to output 8.

TABLEII
PANEL
REGRESSIONS
WITHFIXEDEFFECTSa
Dep. Variable

WTPx 100

qL

-4.57

(0.00)

qD

0.32

(0.00)

DP x qL
Constant

21.56
(0.012)

-1.88
(0.000)

qD

0.23

(0.001)
-0.11
(0.017)
-0.70
(0.177)

aDataconsistof 220 choicesby 22 Followersin the HMNexperiment.One-sided
p valuesareshownin parentheses.
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9. DIAGNOSTICTESTS OF RECIPROCITYWITH STACKELBERGMINI-GAMEDATA

The Stackelbergduopoly game data do not permit tests of some of our most
distinctivepredictions.All FMs (Leaders) have the same choice set, eliminating variabilitythat could help separatethe convexityeffect from the reciprocity
effect. Also, due in part to differingexperiences,SMs mayhave differentviews
on the generosity of a given output choice qL. To overcome these limitations
while preservingthe nice parabolicshape of the SM choice sets, we introduce
a new Stackelbergvariant.
9.3-Stackelberg Mini-Game: Takethe otherwisestandardStackEXAMPLE
elberg duopoly game in Example 3.4, but restrictthe Leader (FM) to a binary
output choice, qL e {x, z}, where 0 < x < z < 24.
The idea here is to manipulatethe Leader'schoice set so as to obtain a direct
test of reciprocity.In one situation, a given output choice can be the smaller
one allowed (hence the most generous to the Follower) and in another situation the same choice can be the largerone (hence the least generous). If a given
Follower reacts differentlyin the two situations,it must be due to reciprocity
effects, since by holding the Leader'soutput constantwe have eliminatedconvexity and shape effects. The formal statement follows:
7: In the Stackelbergmini-gameof Example 9.3, suppose the
PROPOSITION
Leaderhas restrictedoutput choices qL e {x, s} in situation (a) and qL e {s, z}
in anothersituation(b), wheres is strictlybetweenx and z. Supposethe Leader
chooses s in bothsituationsand the Followerchooses Q' (s) in situation(a) and
Q~(s) in situation(b). If the Follower'spreferencessatisfyAxioms R and S, then
Q,(s) > Qb(s) and at each possible Followerchoice qF, WTPa(MqF, Ms)
WTPb(MqF, Ms).
Thus, contraryto standardrevealed preference theory, the model predicts
that the Follower'schoice in a fixed opportunityset F depends in a specificway
on the alternativesnot chosen by the Leader. Our model would be falsified by
observationsif Followerschoose largerquantitiesor revealhigher WTPswhen
Leaders forgo z > s to choose s than when Leaders forgo x < z to choose s.
In our new Stackelbergmini-gameexperiment,each subject in the FM role
twice chooses qL e {6, 9) and twice chooses qL e 19, 12) withoutfeedback.Each
subject in the SM role is then paired simultaneouslywith four different FMs
and chooses an integer value of qF E {5, 6, ..., 11) with no feedback. The corresponding payoffs (m, y) are clearly displayed. Subjects are paid for one of
the four choices, selected randomly at the end of the session. The "double
blind" procedures are detailed in the instructionsto subjects, reproduced in
Appendix B.
To infer how individual subjects respond to reciprocityconcerns, we turn
again to panel regressions with individual subject fixed effects. The second
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TABLEIII
PANEL REGRESSIONS WITH FIXED EFFECTS FOR STACKELBERG
MINI-GAME DATAa

D9

w x 100 (qL = 9)

qD (qL = 9)

qD

-7.65
(0.008)

0.34
(0.008)

0.32
(0.013)
0.37

-5.93
(0.007)
72 (24)

0.27
(0.007)
72 (24)

D12

(0.028)
Constant
Nobs(gr)b

0.19
(0.046)
91(24)

aOne-sidedp valuesareshownin brackets.
bNobsis the totalnumberof observations
(gr is the numberof groups).

column in Table III reports that, consistent with Proposition 7, SMs' average
WTP decreasedby almost 8 cents per dollarwhen qL= 9 was the less generous
choice (indicated by D9 = 1). The second column reports the same data in a
differentway:the output deviation increasedby 0.34 on average,significantat
the p = 0.008 level (one sided) when D9 = 1. Since the opportunityset F9 is
constantin these 72 data points, the result cannot be due to convexityor shape
effects; it must be pure reciprocity.The last column of TableIII reports regressions for qD for the entire data set, using the additionaldummyvariable D12,
which takes value 1 if qL = 12 and 0 otherwise.7The signs of all coefficient
estimates are consistentwith Axioms R and S and convexity.
10. DISCUSSION

Neoclassical theory (e.g., Hicks (1939), Samuelson(1947)) clarifiedand unified earlierwork on how opportunitiesand preferencesjointly determine outcomes for homo economicus.The present paper applies those now classicideas
to social preferences. We focus on need to pay (NTP), the reciprocal of the
marginalrate of transformationof own income into others' income, and willingness to pay (WTP), the reciprocalof the marginalrate of substitutionbetween own income and others' income. Increasing WTP along indifference
curves is simply convexity,and convex altruisticpreferences provide a unified
account of several social motives previouslyconsidered separately,such as efficiency,maximin,and inequalityaversion.
We develop a theory of reciprocalaltruism:how choices by one player shift
preferences of another player and determine outcomes for homo reciprocans.
7Weomit here a dummyvariablethat takes value 1 for qL= 6 because there are only five such
observations.When the dummyis included,the coefficientestimate has the predictedsign but of
course is insignificantstatistically,while the other coefficientestimates change only slightly.
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We say that one opportunityset G is more generous to person X than another
opportunityset F, and write G MGT F, if the maximumincome in G for person X exceeds his maximumin F and does so by more than the corresponding
income difference for the other player. We say that one set of preferences is
more altruisticthan (MAT) another if it has a largerWTP at every point. We
formalize reciprocityas a MAT tilt in preferences following a MGT choice by
others. The definitions apply to malevolent (WTP < 0) as well as benevolent
(WTP > 0) preferences,and automaticallycombine positive and negative reciprocity.
Convexityand reciprocityare quite differentformallyand conceptually,but
we show that empiricalwork has a naturaltendency to confound the two notions. The problemis simplythat more generousbehaviorby a firstmovertends
to push the second mover'sopportunitiessoutheast, towardlarger income for
the second mover and smaller income for the first mover. Convexitytypically
implies greaterWTP as one pushes southeast,even when there is no MATshift
in preferences due to reciprocity.
Axioms R and S set revealed altruismtheory apart from neoclassical preference theory. In neoclassical theory, my preferences are an individualcharacteristic that is independent of your prior actions that help or harm me. In
contrast,Axiom R asserts that more generous choices by you induce more altruisticpreferencesin me. Axiom S furtherassertsthat my inducedpreferences
are more altruisticwhen your generous choice is an act of commission (upsetting the status quo) than when it is an act of omission (upholding the status
quo), and that this reciprocityeffect is even weakerwhen you are unable to alter the status quo. The theory incorporatesnegativelyreciprocalaltruism:less
generous choices by you induce less altruisticpreferences in me, where "less
altruistic"can mean "moremalevolent."
Several theoretical propositions develop the observable consequences of
neoclassical properties such as convexity and the new reciprocity axioms.
We show that more northerlychoices on the eastern boundaryof an opportunity set reveal more altruistic (or less malevolent) preferences. For fixed
preferences, choices in one opportunityset reveal bounds on preferences that
translateinto bounds on choices in other opportunitysets. For reciprocalpreferences, a firstmover'schoice of a more or less generous opportunityset translates into bounds on a second mover's choice, and the bounds are contingent
on the status quo ante. We derive propositionstailored to a set of well-known
two-player games: investment, dictator, carrot and/or stick, and Stackelberg
duopoly.The tailored propositionssort out the separate effects of the neoclassical propertiesand the new axioms.The pairedinvestmentand dictatorgames
provide a diagnostictest of the implicationsof both Axioms R and S. The new
Stackelbergmini-gameprovides a diagnosticseparationof the implicationsof
convexityand reciprocity.
Finally, to illustrate the empiricalcontent of the theory, we examine three
existing data sets and one new data set. Existing data from investment and
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dictator experimentsreject null hypotheses inconsistentwith Axioms R and S
in favor of alternativehypotheses consistent with the axioms (and convexity).
Existingdata from the stick game and the carrotand stick game supportimplications of Axiom R (and convexity).Existingdata from a Stackelbergduopoly
experiment confirmreciprocity/convexityeffects and suggest a stronger negative response to greedy behavior than the positive response to generous behavior. Data from a new experimentwith the Stackelbergmini-game confirm
that reciprocityhas a significantimpact even when convexityeffects are held
constant.The Stackelbergmini-gamebringsout a novel feature of the new theory: contraryto standardrevealed preference theory, revealed altruismtheory
explainshow alternativesnot chosen by another can affect one's own choice.
Theoretical clarificationsets the stage for further empiricalwork. One can
now refine earlier empirical studies that examine the combined effects of altruism and reciprocity.Such work should shed light not only on the extent to
which typicalhumanpreferencesdepartfrom selfishness,but also on the extent
to which such departuresare altered by experiencinggenerous or ungenerous
behavior.
Further theoretical work is also in order. We consider two versions of the
"more generous than" relation, but yet other versions may have implications
that are stronger (or just different). For example, generosity might be defined
in terms of players'utilities ratherthan in terms of materialpayoffs (although
this would compromise observability).Other open theoretical questions concern Axiom S, which invokes the status quo to distinguishbetween acts of commission and omission, and between generous and greedy acts. But what does
it take for a particularact to become generally recognized as the status quo?
What if an act has beneficial short run impact but is harmfulin the long run?
Answers to these and other questions await furthertheoretical development.
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APPENDIX

A: MATHEMATICALPROOFS AND DERIVATIONS

A.1. Propertiesof Preferences
Recall that preferences over bundles (m, y) e St are admissibleif they can
be representedby a twice continuouslydifferentiable(smooth) utility function
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u such that du(m, y)/dm = u, > 0, V(m, y) e 2N (m-monotone) and the set
{(m, y) e Z:u(m, y) > c} is convex for all c eE9 (convex). Recall also that
willingnessto pay is w = w(m, y) = WTP(m, y) = u,/um.
It will be helpful to express convexity in terms of the curvature of indifference curves. At a given point, curvature has absolute value IKI= 1/R,
where R is the radius of the circle that is second-order tangent to the curve
at the given point. Let 0 denote the angle of the tangent to the indifference
curvewith the negative y direction.The signed curvatureis K = dO/ds, where
s(t) =
m'12(x)+ 2(x) dx is arc length along the indifference curve (e.g.,
Protter and Morrey(1963, p. 394)).
Preferences are positivelymonotonic in m; hence upper contour sets are on
the rightof indifferencecurvesin (m, y) space. The convexityof upper contour
sets implies that w decreases as we move up along the indifferencecurve.The
first lemma verifies this intuition and obtains other useful characterizations.

f

LEMMA
A.1: Thefollowingpropertiesareequivalentfor smooth m-monotone
preferenceson 92
(a) Theyare convex.
have negative(orzero) curvature.
(b) Theirindifferencecurveseverywhere
(c) ww

- Wy>>0.

PROOF:Note that along the indifference curve 0 = arctan(dm/dy)
arctan(-w). Into the definition K = dO/ds, insert dO = -d(w)/(1 + w2),
ds = vdm2 + dy2, and (holding u constant) -dm/dy = w to get
(A.1)

K=

1

dw

/w2 + 13 dy

Since the expression inside the radical is positive, the sign of K is that of
dw/dy. The upper contour set at a point (mo, yo) with u(mo, yo) = c lies on
the rightor on the tangenthyperplaneif and only if (dw/dy) Iu(m,y)=c O0,
as can
be seen, for example,from a straightforwardadaptationof Protterand Morrey
(1963). Hence conditions (a) and (b) are equivalent.To verify the equivalence
of (b) and (c), simply substitute dw/dy = Wmdm/dy + wy and dm/dy = -w
into (A.1) to obtain
(A.2)

K=-

WWm
wm -

Wyy

/w2+1-3

"

LEMMAA.2: (d(NTP)/dy)

Q.E.D.
I(m,y)EdF

> 0 at every regular boundary point of an

opportunityset.
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PROOF:The reasoning is the same as in the previous lemma. Along the
boundary
(A.3)

K=

1

d(NTP)
3

VNTP2

31

dy

Thus K = dOlds has the same sign as d(NTP)/dy. Our feasible opportunityset
F lies on the left or on the tangenthyperplaneat a point from the boundarydF.
Hence, as y increasesthe boundaryis turningleft, so 0 increasesand (by (A.3))
NTP increases.
Q.E.D.
The next lemma characterizeshomotheticityto facilitatecomparisonsto the
weaker propertiesused in the propositions.
A.3: Thefollowingare equivalent:
LEMMA
(a) Preferencesare homotheticon 912
(b) w = WTPis constantalongeveryrayRr= {(t, tr) : t > 01 C 9.
(c) Wm+ Wyr= 0 along everyrayRr, r > 0.
PROOF:By definition, preferences are homothetic if and only if they can
be represented by a utility function u(m, y) whose ratio of partial derivatives um/u, depends only on the ratio m/y (e.g., Simon and Blume (1994,
p. 503)). Thus condition (a) implies that w = u,/Um is constant along the ray
with r = m/y and so condition (b) must hold. In turn, condition (b) implies
that along that ray 0 = dw/dt = Wmdm/dt + wydy/dt = Wm+ Wyr,establishSince rayswith r> 0 foliate 92N\ (0, 0), condition (c) implies
ing condition
ing
condition (c).
(c).
that w and hence
um/uy depend only on r = m/y, that is, (a) must hold. Q.E.D.
DEFINITION
3: Preferences are rather malevolent (resp. not very malevodomain
D if w < wy/Wm(resp. w > wy/Wm)holds at all points in
on
a
lent)
Dc 2 .
LEMMAA.4: (a) If admissiblepreferencesare homotheticon 92, then they
are IB.
(b) Convexityon 92 is equivalentto IB for preferencesthatarenot verymalevolent, and is equivalentto wm < 0 forpreferencesthatare rathermalevolent.
PROOF:For part (a) we need to show that wm(m,y) is nonnegative. It suffices to show that the sign of w(m + 8, y) - w(m, y) is the same as the sign of
8, for all 8. If 8 > 0, then (m + 8, y) is on a ray (Ry/(m+6))with a smaller slope
than the ray through (m, y). This, convexity, and homotheticity imply that
w(m + 8, y) w(m, y). Similarly,w(m + 8, y) < w(m, y) for negative 8. For
part (b), recall_from Lemma A.1 that convexityis equivalentto wmW- wy 0.
But thisis equivalentto wm > 0 (wm 0) if w > Wy/wm(w Wy/Wm). Q.E.D.
_
_
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To see the bite of the assumptions, consider preferences represented by
u(m, y) = m'/r - y(l+r)/(1 +r). For r > 1, these preferencesare IB, but neither
convex nor homothetic.For r E (0, 1), however,they are convex,but neither IB
nor homothetic.
A.2. Proof thatMATIs a PartialOrdering
The propertiesof reflexivityand transitivityare inheritedfrom the reflexivity
and transitivityof the real ordering>. The antisymmetrypropertyfollows from
Hicks'lemma (Hicks (1939, Appendix)):if preferenceshave the same MRS (or
WTP) everywherein a domain D, then they are the same on that domain.
A.3. Proof thatMGTIs a PartialOrdering
Reflexivity,antisymmetry,and transitivityall are inherited from the correspondingpropertiesof the real ordering >.
A.4. Proof that StackelbergFollower'sOpportunity
SetsAre MGT-Ranked
The Follower's opportunity set
has eastern boundary {(m, y):m =
FqL
MqF, y = MqL, qF E [0, T - qL]},where M = T - qL- qF.Along this boundary
NTP is given by
dm/dqF
dy/dqF

T - qL- 2qF
qL

Note that NTP varies smoothly from positive to negative values as increasing
qF passes through q0 = T/2 - qL/2, the selfish best response. To see that a
smaller output by the Leader produces a MGT opportunityset for the Follower, first note that Y(qL) = (T - qL)qLis obtained when qF = 0 and that
- qL)2 is obtained from the standard (selfish) reaction function qO.To verify condition (a) in the MGT definition, let q' E (qL, T - qL)
- qL) > 0. Condition (b)
and note that m()
(q = -(2T-q-)(q'qL
=
follows from YF(q,)Y;(q') (qL+ q' - T)(q'
qL) < O.
m)*

=
-(T

A.5. Examplesof MGT-Ordered
OpportunitySets
EXAMPLE
A.5.1--Ring Test (Liebrand(1984); see also Sonnemans,van Dijk,
and van Winden (2006)): Let F(R) = {(m, y) E2: nm2
+ y2 < R2} for given
R > 0. On the circularpart of the boundary,NTP is y/m and the curvatureis
1/R. Straightforwardly,F(R) MGT F(R') if R > R'.
EXAMPLE
A.5.2-Ultimatum Game (Giuth,Schmittberger,and Schwarze
(1982)): The responder'sopportunitiesin the $10 ultimatumgame consist of
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the origin (0, 0) and (due to our free disposal assumption)the horizontalline
segment from (0, 10 - x) to (x, 10 - x). This set is not convex so it does not
qualifyas an opportunityset by our definition. Its convex hull, however, is the
opportunityset in the convex ultimatumgame (Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie
(2003)), which is identical to that of the power to take game in the following
example.
A.5.3-Power to Take Game (Bosman and van Winden (2002)):
EXAMPLE
The "take authority"playerchooses a take rate b E [0, 1]. Then the responder
with income I chooses a destructionrate 1 - 8. The resultingpayoffs are m =
(1 - b)5I for the responder and y = b5I for the take authority.Thus, with
free disposal the responder'sopportunityset is the convex hull of three points
(m, y) = (0, 0), (0, bI), and ((1 - b)I, bI). Along the eastern boundaryNTP is
constant at (b - 1)/b and the curvatureis 0. To verify the strict MGT ranking,
let b' > b > 0 produce SM opportunitysets F and G, respectively, so m* =
(1 - b')I and yF = b'l. Then m* - m* = (b' - b)I > 0 > (b - b')I = y? - yF.
The first inequality confirms part (a) of the definition and the entire string
confirmspart (b).
EXAMPLE
A.5.4--Ultimatum Mini-Games (Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson
(1995), Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher(2003)): In the notation of the previous
example,the FM in these games chooses between b = 0.8 and one other value,
either b = 0.5 in the 5/5 game, or b = 0.2 in the 2/8 game, or b = 0.8 in the 8/2
game, or b = 1.0 in the 10/0 game. The previous example shows that the (convexified) opportunitysets are MGT-rankedby decreasingb. Axiom R suggests
that the SM is more likely to choose (0, 0) (reject the ultimatum)rather than
((1 - b)I, bI) (accept) when the FM's choice of b was less generous. Hence rejections of the b = 0.8 proposal should be more frequentwhen the alternative
was b = 0.5 or b = 0.2 ratherthan b = 1.0. Axiom S suggeststhat the responses
would be mutedwhen the alternativewas b = 0.8 (i.e., no choice). The data are
consistent with these predictions;see Cox, Friedman,and Gjerstad(2007) for
a detailed structuralanalysis.
EXAMPLE
A.5.5-Moonlighting Game (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner
In
this
variant of the investment game, the FM sends s e [-1/2, 1]
(2000)):
to the SM, who receives g(s) = ks for positive s and g(s) = s for negative
s. Then the second mover transfers t E [(-I + s)/k, I + g(s)], resulting in
nonnegative payoffs m = I + g(s) - Itl, and y = I - s + t for positive t and
y = I - s + kt for negative t. The second mover'sopportunityset is the convex
hull of the points (m, y) = (0, 0), (I + g(s) - (I - s)/ k, 0), (I + g(s), I - s),
and (0, 21 + g(s) - Isl). The NTP along the boundaryof the opportunityset
is 1 above and -1/k below the t = 0 locus, is 0 along the y axis, and is oc
along the m axis.Again, curvatureat all regularboundarypoints is K = 0. It is
straightforwardto verifythat largers produces higher MGT ranking.
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A.5.6-Gift Exchange Labor Markets (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and
EXAMPLE
Riedl (1993)): The employer with initial endowment I offers a wage We
[0, I] and the worker then chooses an effort level e E [0, 1] with a quadratic
cost function c(e). The final payoffs are m = W - c(e) for the worker and
y = I + ke - W for the employer,where the productivityparameterk = 10 in
a typical game. The worker'sopportunityset is similarto the second mover's
in the investment game, except that the northeasternboundaryis a parabolic
arc instead of a straightline of slope -1. Along this eastern boundaryNTP is
2e and the curvatureis -1/5(4e2 + 1)3/2. Also, if the employeroffers a wage in
excess of his endowmentI, then the opportunityset includespart of the quadrant [m > 0 > y]. It is straightforwardbut a bit messy to extend the definition
of opportunityset to include such possibilities.Again, one can directlyverify
that larger W produces higher MGT ranking.
EXAMPLE
A.5.7-Sequential VCM Public Good Game with Two Players
(Varian (1994)): Each player has initial endowment I. The FM contributes
cl e [0, I] to the public good. The SM observes cl and then chooses his contribution c2 e [0, I]. Each unit contributedhas a returnof a e (0.5, 1], so the final
payoffs are m = I + acl - (1 - a)c2 for the SM and y = I + ac2 - (1 - a)cl for
the FM. The SM's opportunityset is the convexhull of the four points (m, y) =
(0, I - (1 - a)cl), (I + ac, I - (1 - a)cl), (aI +
(1 + a)I - (1 - a)cl),
acl,
and (0, (1 + a)I - (1 - a)cl). Along the Pareto frontier,
NTP is constant at
(1 a)/a. Once again, a largercontributioncl creates MGT opportunitiesfor
the second mover.
A.6. Proof of Proposition1
Suppose that (mA, YA) EF. Then by definitionof dEF there exists z > MA
such that M = (z, YA) E F. Positive monotonicityin own payoff implies that M
is strictlypreferredto (mAA,YA), contradictingthe hypothesisthat (mAA,YA) is
the A-preferredpoint in F.
A.7. Proof of Proposition2 (TheoreticalPredictionsfor Fixed Opportunity
Sets)
By Lemma A.2, NTP increases as y increases along dEF.
Part 1: Convexityof F and optimality of (mB,yB) imply that dEF (including the part north of (m,, ye)) lies in the negative closed half-space for the
tangent line HB to the B-indifference curve through (mr, y ). B MAT A implies that the tangent line HA of the A-indifference curve through the same
point (mB,y,) is a clockwise rotation of HB. Hence, the dEF-pointsnorth of
(mB, y,) are from the negative half-spaceof HA and, from convexityof preferences A, their A-indifference curves are at lower levels than (mnB,ye). Therefore (mnA,
must be south of (mB, ye).
y•)
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Part 2: By hypothesis, X = (m, y) is south of
and north of
(mrB,y1)

(mA, YA).Let Wa and wb denote WTP functions for A and B preferences;

by admissibilitythe functions are continuous. The desired conclusion is trivial if wb(m, y) = Wa(m, y) and Lemma A.2 rules out wb(m, y) < Wa(m, y),
so suppose wb(m, y) > Wa(m, y). To construct the desired preferences 7, let
wp(Y) = kwb(Y) + (1 - k)wa(Y), where
NTP(m, y) - Wa(m, y)
Wb(m,y) - Wa(m,y)
Since wp is continuouson 9t2, classic theorems assure the existence of a utility
functionwhose WTP is
(Hurwicz(1958, pp. 7-10); see also Hurwiczand
we(Y) the preferences representedby this
Uzawa (1971)). Let P denote
utility function. Since the hypothesisimplies that 0 < k < 1, we have B MAT P MAT A.
By construction,(m, y) is P-chosen since wp(m, y) = NTP(m, y).
Part3: Linear preferenceswith w approaching-oo (+oo) yield choices arbitrarilyclose to SF (NF).
A.8. Proof of Proposition3 (TheoreticalPredictionsfor Different
OpportunitySets)
Suppose that X is a regularpoint from dEF. Then x = NTP(X) is unique.
Let the NTP of points from dEG take values between [y,, y*]. Z is NF if
NTP(X) > y* and SF if NTP(X) < y,; otherwise Z is the point of 9EG with
x = NTP(Z). Such a point exists by the intermediate value theorem and is
unique because G is convex. If X is not a regular point, then NTP(X) takes
values from some [6,, 8*]. Make the arbitraryconvention that x = 8* and proceed as with a regularpoint.

Part 1: Follows from standard revealed preference theory (e.g., Varian
(1992, pp. 131-133)).
Part 2: Clearly 'i mF and WTPm > 0 imply WTP(Y) < WTP(X), while
<
NTPaF(X) < NTPdG(Y),optimality of X (so WTP(X) = NTPdF(X)), and
transitivitytogether imply that WTP(Y) < NTPOG(Y).By convexityof A, all
points from dG north of Y are on lower A-indifference curves than Y so they
cannot be W. Thus W must be south of Y and 2(a) follows. One obtains 2(b)
in just the same way.
Part3: Suppose Z is southeast of X. Then
WTP(Z) > WTP(X) = NTPdF(X) = NTPdG(Z),
where the first inequalityfollows by assumption,whereas the equalities follow
from optimalityof X and by constructionof Z. By convexityof A, all points
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from dG south of Z are on lower A-indifference curvesthan Z so they cannot
be W. That is, W must be north of Z. Likewisefor the case with Z northwest
of X.
A.9. Proof of Proposition4 (InvestmentGame)
Part 1: Let r(s) be the optimal choice of the SM when the FM choice is s
and let XF, = (10 + 3s - r(s), 10 - s + r(s)). Let s' > s. Proposition3(b) tells
us that
This implies that r(s') > s' - s + r(s) > r(s).
yF,,> YFs.
Part2: ApplyingAxiom R in the argumentabove,we see that r(s') increases
more rapidlyin s than for fixed preferences.
Part 3: Axiom S has the indicated impact since, as shown in the previous
subsection,F, is MGT orderedby s.
A.10. Proofof Proposition5 (Carrot,Stick,and Carrot-StickGames)
Let r(s) be the optimal choice of the SM when the FM choice is s and let
= (S - Ir(s)I,240 - s + 5r(s)). Let s' > s. The amountreturnedr(s) is nonXFs
positive in the stick game, nonnegativein the carrotgame, and can be either in
the carrot-stickgame.
Part 1: Proposition3(b) tells us that yFs, > yFs. This implies that r(s') > (s' -

s)/5 + r(s) > r(s).

Part2: ApplyingAxiom R in the argumentabove,we see that r(s) increases
more rapidlyin s than for fixed preferencesin the stick game.
A.11. Proof of Proposition6 (StackelbergDuopolyGame)
The FOC can be written as w(qF, qL) =WTP(MqF, MqL) = NTP = (24 2qF)/qL- 1, which can be rewrittenas
(A.4)

qF= 12 -

+1
qFqL)
2

Insertingthe definitionof QD from the statementof the proposition,we obtain
(A.5)

QD =-

w(qF,
qL) qL
w
2
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Part 1-Linear Preferences:If Follower's preferences are fixed and linear
with WTP = w, then differentiationof (A.5) with respect to qLgives
dQD
dqL

w
2

Part2-Convex Preferences:If Follower'spreferences are fixed and convex,
then
dQD

W(qF, qL)

dqL

2

qL dW(qF, qL)

2

dqL

The additional(second) term above is positive because, as we now will verify,
dw(qF, qL)/dqLis negative. Indeed,
dw(qF, qL)
dqL
dm
dy
= Wm
+
Wy
dqL
dqL
=

Wm

-1 -

qF +M

+Wy

-1-

M
qL +
,

which after substitutingM = 24 - qL - qF, qF = 12 - (w(qF, qL) + 1)qL/2,
and dqF/dqL = -(w(qF,
dw(qF, qL)/dqL yields

dw(qF, qL)
dqL

qL) + 1)/2 - (dw(qF, qL)/dqL)qL/2, and solving for

B
A'

where
A = 2 + [WmW-Wy]q2> 0
by Lemma A.1 and
- Wy+
B = 24(w, - Wm)+ qL(1 - W)(Wm
- wy)
WWm
=
- wy).
(Wy Wm)(24 qL(1- w)) + qL(1- W)(WWm
Note that qF 24 - qLand (A.4) implythat the sign of the second factor in the
first term is positive;hence B is negative if and only if
Wy-wm

1-w

wwm - wy - 24/qL - (1 -W)
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The currentassumptionsof w < 1, convexity,and IB (i.e., w, 0) ensure that
the right-handside of the last expressionis nonnegativewhereas
>_ the left-hand
side is negative, so the inequalityholds.
Part 3--Axiom R Effect: Let wr(qF, qL) denote WTP for changed preferences as per Axiom R. Then
wr(qF, qL)

2

QD

qL

for all qLand
dQr

wr(q,, qL)

dqL

2

qLdw'(qF, qL)
2

w(qF, qL)
2

dqL

wr(qF,qL) - W(qF,qL)
2

qLdwr(qF, qL)
2
dqL

From Axiom R, the second term is positive. The derivationof the sign of the
third term is similarto part 2 above.
Part 4--Axiom S Effect: Let wS(qF, qL) denote WTP for changed preferences as in Axiom S. Then
D

Ws (qF, qL)

22

qL

is smaller (larger) than Qr if the status quo is smaller (larger) than qL,and
dQ

dqL

ws
(qr,
2

qL)

qLdws (qF, qL)

2

dqL

has an additionalpositive (negative) term if the status quo is smaller (larger)
than qL.
A.12. Proof of Proposition7 (StackelbergMini-Game)
In situation (a), induced preferences
are
or
depending on
AaF
AF,
AFa
whether output x is considered as status quo by the Follower. Axiom S implies Aa MAT Aa and A a MAT
Similarly,in situation (b), Axiom S
.Aa.
MAT AF. By transitivityAbs MAT A. Then
implies A Ax
MAT F and
AF
the last inequalityis straightforward
by definitionof MAT,whereas for the first
one recall that (i) q) stays constant (it depends only on s) and (ii) NTP along
8F, decreases as increases.
qv
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APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome
This is an experimentabout decision-making.You will be paid a $5 participation fee plus an additional positive or zero amount of money determined by
the decisions that you and the other participantsmake, as explained below.
Payment is in cash at the end of the experiment.A research foundation has
providedthe funds for this experiment.
No TalkingAllowed
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have
a question, please raise your hand and an experimenterwill approachyou and
answeryour question in private.
A Monitor and TwoGroups
A monitorwill be selected randomlyfrom among those of you who came here
today. The rest of you have been dividedrandomlyinto two groups, called the
First Mover Group and the Second Mover Group.
CompletePrivacy
The experiment is structured so that no one-not even the experimenters,
the monitor, and the other subjects-will ever know your personal decision
in the experiment. You collect your cash payment from a staff person in the
Economics Department office who has no other role in the experiment.Your
paymentis in a sealed envelope with a code letter (A, B, C, etc.). Yourprivacy
is guaranteedbecause neither your name nor your student ID numberwill appear on any decision records.The only identifyingmarkon the decision forms
will be a code letter known only to you. You will show your code letter to the
staff person and nobody else will see it. The experimenterswill not be in the
departmentoffice when you collect you cash payment.This procedure is used
to protect your privacy.
The Idea of the Game
The game involves two players, called the First Mover (FM) and the Second
Mover (SM), in the roles of producersof an identical good. Each decides how
much to produce. The profit for each player is the numberof units he decides
to produce times price, net of cost. The price of the good decreases as total
production increases. If you and the other player produce too much, you will
drive down the price and your profits. Of course, if you don't produce much
you won't have many units to sell.
To simplifyyour task, the profits will be calculated for you and shown in an
easy-to-readtable. Your cash payment will include the profit you earn in one
round of the game. The round will be selected randomlyat the end of the experiment.
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Game Details
Each round the FM chooses between two possible amounts to produce, as
shown in a table with two rows. The SM sees the choice of the FM, and then
decides among seven possible amountsto produce, as shown in seven columns
of the same table. The table showsthe profitsfor both players.The FM's profit
is shown in italics in the lower left corner of each box, and the SM's profit is
shown in bold in the upper right corner. For example, in Table B.1 below, if
FM chooses Output = 6 and SM then chooses Output = 4, then FM's profit is
84 and SM's profit is 56.

TABLEB.1
SM'sChoiceof Output
Quantity
4
FM's output = 6

84 56

FM's output = 9

9944
99

5

7

6

78 65
72
50 81 54
90
90
81

72

8
77
56

9

10

11

80
81
80
77
56 54
3644
450
63
54
45
36

Different SubjectPairs in EveryDecision
Each First Mover and each Second Mover will make four decisions. But the
pairingof First Moverswith Second Moverswill be differentin every decision.
This means that you will interact with a DIFFERENT person in the other
group in every decision that you make.
ExperimentProceduresand the Monitor
At the beginning of the experiment,the monitor will walk through the room
carryinga box containing unmarked,large manila envelopes. Each subject in
the First Mover Group will take one of these envelopes from the box. This
envelope will contain the experimentdecision forms and a code letter.
After the First Movers have made their decisions, they return the experiment
decision formsto their large manilaenvelopes and then walk to the front of the
room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very important
that the First Movers do NOT return their code letters to the large manila
envelopes, because they will need them to collect their payoffs.
After all First Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Monitor
will take the box to another room in which the experimenterswill sort the
decision forms and place them in the correct large manila envelopes for the
Second Movers. The experimenterswill also put code letters in the envelopes
for the Second Movers.
Next, the Monitor will walk through the room carryinga box containing unmarked,large manila envelopes. Each subjectin the Second Mover Groupwill
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take one of these envelopes from the box. This envelope will contain the experiment decision forms and a code letter.
After the Second Movers have made their decisions, they return the experiment decision forms to their large manila envelopes and then walk to the front
of the room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very important that the Second Movers do NOT returntheir code letters in the large
manila envelopes because they will need them to collect their payoffs.
After all Second Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Monitor will take the box to another room in which the experimenterswill record
the profitsand cash paymentsdeterminedby the subjects'decisions.
A Roll of a Die DeterminesWhich Decision Pays Money
Although you will make four decisions, only one will pay cash. Which of these
decisionswill pay cash will be determinedby rolling a six-sideddie. The experimenter will roll the die in front of you and the monitor will announce which
of the numberedsides has ended up on top. The first numberfrom 1 to 4 that
ends up on top will determine the page numberof the decision that pays cash.
The monitor's cash paymentwill be the average of all First Movers' and Second Movers'payments.
Be Careful
Be careful in recordingyour decisions. If a First Mover forgets to circle one of
the rowsin the table or circlesboth rows on the same decision page, then it will
be impossible to ascertainwhat decision the First Mover made. In that case,
the First Mover will get paid 0 and the Second Mover will get paid 60 if that
decision page is selected for payoff by the roll of the die. If a Second Mover
doesn't circle a column, then it will be impossible to ascertainwhat decision
the Second Mover made. In that case, the Second Mover will get paid 0 and
the First Mover will get paid 60 if that decision page is selected for payoff by
the roll of the die.
Pay Rates
For each point of profityou earn, the experimenterwill put a fixed number of
dollarsin your envelope. This fixed numberis called the pay rate and is written
on the board at the front of the room. Today'spay rate is $0.25, which means
that everyparticipantearns 25 cents for each profit point shown in the table.
FrequentlyAsked Questions
Q01:Exactlyhow are profitscalculatedin the tables?
A: Price is 30 minus the sum of FM output and SM output. Marginalcost is 6.
Profitis output times (price minus marginalcost). But you don't have to worry
about doing the calculation;the tables do it for you.
Q2: Who will knowwhat decisions I make?
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A: Nobody else besides you; that is the point of the privateenvelopes etc. The
experimentersare only interested in knowing the distributionof choices for
FMs and SMs, not in the privatedecisions of individualparticipants.
Q3: Is this some psychologyexperimentwith an agendayou haven'ttold us?
A: No. It is an economics experiment.If we do anythingdeceptive or don't pay
you cash as described,then you can complain to the campus Human Subjects
Committee and we will be in serious trouble. These instructionsare on the
level and our interest is in seeing the distributionof choices made in complete
privacy.
Any More Questions?
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenterwill
approachyou and answeryour question in private.Make sure that you understand the instructionsbefore beginning the experiment;otherwise you could,
by mistake,mark a different decision than you intended.
Quiz
1. In TableB.2 below,what are the two possible output choices for the FM?
TABLEB.2
SM'sChoiceof Output
Quantity
4
FM's output = 9
oupu = 12
FM'sFM'
output

5

6

90 50 8154
9944
32
35 7236
84
72
96

7

8

9

10

11

44
63 56 54 54 45 50
7256
60 35 48 32 36 27 24 20 12 11

2. Does the SM see the FM's choice? (Y or N)
3. In TableB.2, can the SM choose:
(a) Output = 5? _ _(Y or N)
(b) Output = 7?_ _(Y or N)
(c) Output = 12?_ _(Y or N)
4. Suppose the FM chooses the top row (Output = 9) in TableB.2 and the
SM chooses a middle column (Output = 8).
(a) How manypoints will the FM get?
points
How
much
is
if
that
this
is
decision
that pays money?
the
(b)
money
$
(c) How much will the SM get in this case?
points, $
5. In the previous question, if the SM chose Output = 9 instead of
Output = 8,
(a) how many more or fewer points would the SM get?
more/fewerpoints
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6.
7.
8.
9.

(b) howmanymoreor fewerpointswouldthe FMget?
more/fewerpoints
If the FM choosesthe top row,whatis the maximumnumberof points
thatthe SMcanget? the minimumnumber?
If the FM choosesthe bottomrow,what is the maximumnumberof
pointsthatthe SMcanget?__ the minimumnumber?
Will the SM ever be able to tell whichpersonmade any FM choice?
(Y or N)
Will the FM ever be able to tell whichpersonmade any SM choice?

(YorN)

10. Will the experimenterever be able to tell who made any choices?

(YorN)
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